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Abstract 
 
We analyze the stock market by modeling it as a timing game among arbitrageurs 
for beating the gun. We assume that (1) arbitrageurs are behavioral with a small 
probability, (2) the bubble soft-lands, and (3) the postcrash price increases as the X-day 
is postponed. Due to these assumptions, the effect of reputation assumes importance 
because any rational arbitrageur is willing to build a reputation in order to ride the 
bubble. It is demonstrated that the bubble persists for a long period as an outcome of a 
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, even if all arbitrageurs are almost certainly 
rational. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation underlying the willingness of 
rational arbitrageurs to develop reputations to ride the bubble in the stock market, 
instead of competing with each other to beat the gun at the earliest. We modeled the 
stock market as a timing game among arbitrageurs. Our model is inspired by Abreu and 
Brunnermeier (2003); however, it does not require their key assumptions such as 
sequential awareness and coordinated attacks.
3  Instead, we assume that arbitrageurs are 
behavioral with a small probability, in that they are subject to momentum trading just 
like amateur behavioral traders. We also assume that the bubble soft-lands after it 
crashes, and that the postcrash price increases as the X-Day is postponed. Based on 
these assumptions, we can apply the basic concept of the reputation theory explored by 
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) in the finitely repeated prisoners’ 
dilemma
4 to the stock market. According to the effect of the arbitrageurs’ reputation, 
the bubble can persist for a long period, even if arbitrageurs are almost certainly 
rational. 
                                                 
3  See also Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002) and Brunnermeier and Morgan (2006). 
4  For general surveys on the reputation theory, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 9) and 
Mailath and Samuelson (2006, Part IV).   4
The efficient market hypothesis asserts that by reflecting all relevant information, 
the stock price is always adjusted to its fundamental value (for instance, see Fama (1970, 
1991)). However, even though it is a cornerstone of modern financial theory, the 
efficient market hypothesis is highly controversial. There are considerable empirical 
evidences that contradict this hypothesis: the stock price sometimes increases beyond 
the fundamental value, and continues to increase until it goes into a free fall. In other 
words, the bubble sometimes develops, persists, and then suddenly crashes. Advocates 
of behavioral finance, such as Shleifer (2000) and Shiller (2000), argued that the bubble 
is driven by behavioral traders; they incorrectly believe that the stock price will increase 
at a high growth rate in perpetuity. The efficient market hypothesis, on the other hand, 
claims that rational arbitrageurs quickly undo this mispricing; their selling pressure 
dampens the enthusiasm of these traders, immediately bursting the bubble. 
In contrast to this ideal of rational arbitrageurs, actual professional arbitrageurs, 
who are mostly considered to be rational, generally do not think that the best strategy is 
to undo mispricing quickly. Instead, they would like to ride the bubble and sell out just 
prior to the X-Day on which they anticipate the bubble to crash. On the basis of 
historical facts and experiences, several authors such as Kindleberger (1978) and Soros 
(1994) emphasized the notion of self-feeding bubbles. In their view, speculative price   5
movements involve multiple professional arbitrageurs who continuously drive the stock 
price up and then sell out at the top to the behavioral traders, who, in turn, sell out at the 
bottom. 
However, we disagree with this view because arbitrageurs may compete with each 
other to beat the gun at the earliest; this phenomenon, along with the backward 
induction method, prevents a bubble from persisting. Hence, in order for the notion of 
self-feeding bubbles to be convincing, we need to demonstrate a theoretical foundation 
based on which each rational arbitrageur is willing to terminate this chain reaction of 
competition and develop a reputation in order to ride the bubble for a long period. 
Based on these arguments, the present paper models the stock market as a timing 
game among arbitrageurs. The stock market operates during the continuous time 
interval  0 [0, ] τ , and each arbitrageur selects a timing at or before the terminal time 
0 0 τ >  to exit the market by selling her/his share. As long as no arbitrageur has sold, 
the bubble continues to be driven by the behavioral traders. Once any arbitrageur sells, 
the bubble crashes and the stock price decreases drastically. Any arbitrageur who fails 
to keep up with this crash cannot enjoy the benefit of bubbles as well as the winner can. 
We assume that every arbitrageur is not necessarily rational; there is a small 
probability that she/he is behavioral like the behavioral traders, and never bursts the   6
bubble of her/his own accord. Moreover, we assume that the bubble soft-lands after it 
crashes, i.e., the stock price does not immediately decline to its fundamental value. 
Hence, even a rational arbitrageur who fails to keep up with this crash can sell at the 
postcrash price that is still greater than the fundamental value. We also assume that the 
postcrash price increases exponentially as the X-Day is postponed. 
Based on these assumptions, we observe that the reputation of the arbitrageur 
facilitates the persistence of bubbles. On witnessing the persistence of a bubble, each 
rational arbitrageur is increasingly convinced that the other arbitrageurs are behavioral, 
which incentivizes her/him to further postpone timing the market. With a minor 
restriction on timing games, it is shown that there exists a unique symmetric mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium describes a pattern of bubbles and crashes 
where a particular point of time referred to as the hazard time exists such that: 
(i)  the bubble never crashes until the hazard time, and 
(ii)  the bubble crashes at a constant hazard rate after the hazard time. 
Given that the terminal time  0 τ   is sufficiently late, we can make the probability of 
each arbitrageur being behavioral close to zero. It is important to note that any rational 
arbitrageur expects to earn hardly any profit by exploiting behavioral arbitrageurs; 
instead, she/he expects to make a considerable profit from the increase in the postcrash   7
price by postponing the X-Day. 
The present paper is closely related to Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), who also 
modeled the stock market as a timing game, and were the first to present a theoretical 
ground which explained that the resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of 
arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies. Abreu and Brunnermeier assumed 
sequential awareness and coordinated attacks, i.e., the arbitrageurs become sequentially 
aware that the bubble has developed, and selling pressure bursts the bubble only when a 
sufficient number of arbitrageurs have sold out. The present paper does not require these 
assumptions; instead, we assume that (1) each arbitrageur is not necessarily rational, (2) 
the bubble soft-lands, and (3) the delay of the X-Day increases the postcrash price. 
Using these assumptions along with mixed strategies, we can show an alternative 
ground with regard to the inability of arbitrageurs to coordinate their selling strategies. 
In Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), the endogenous determination of the X-Day is 
not greatly influenced by the delay of the terminal time  0 τ , at which the bubble 
inevitably crashes for exogenous reasons. In contrast, in the model proposed by the 
present paper, the determination of the X-Day is sensitive to the delay of the terminal 
time  0 τ  in a substantial manner. This delay strengthens the effect of reputation, which 
can prompt the bubble to persist much longer.   8
Keynes (1936, Chapter 12) likened the competition among professional 
arbitrageurs to a beauty contest, in which people guess which faces others will find to 
be the most beautiful. Experimental economists such as Nagel (1995) designed a simple 
beauty contest game that captures the basic concept of reasoning that Keynes had in 
mind. They reported that subjects in laboratories are mostly irrational in terms of 
reasoning ability; they tend to enforce only two or three rounds of iteration in order to 
eliminate dominated strategies.
5  The experimental economists explained that the bubble 
can persist, since arbitrageurs are almost certainly irrational. 
The main body of the present paper, however, assumes that arbitrageurs are almost 
certainly rational; there is only a very small probability of each arbitrageur being 
irrational—not in terms of reasoning ability but of behavioral bias. A huge volume of 
empirical and experimental researches in behavioral finance reported that amateur 
traders are tend to be greatly influenced by behavioral cultures that lead them to engage 
in momentum trading.
6 Even professional arbitrageurs are not immune to the effect of 
these cultures; as Shiller (2000) has explained, there may be no clear distinction 
between professionals and amateurs, because the professionals advise the amateurs. 
                                                 
5  See Camerer (2003, Chapters 1 and 5) for experimental researches on beauty contest games. 
6 See Barberis and Thaler (2003) for a general survey of behavioral finance. See also DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a, 1990b).   9
  In the final section, like Strotz (1955) and Rabin (1998), we shall replace the 
reputation theory with the self-control problem in the following manner. We assume 
that each arbitrageur is quasi-rational, in that at the early stage of the timing game, 
she/he does not know whether she/he will become behavioral in the future. Hence, any 
quasi-rational arbitrageur may control her/himself by advancing the timing to exit the 
market out of the fear that she/he becomes behavioral and fails to sell out before the 
stock price reaches bottom. We, however, show that as long as the terminal time  0 τ  is 
sufficiently late, any quasi-rational arbitrageur will be willing to take this risk. The 
persistence of bubbles is robust to the self-control exercised by arbitrageurs, because we 
can make the probability of each arbitrageur becoming behavioral close to zero. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines timing games. 
Section 3 indicates a necessary and sufficient condition under which the quick crash of 
bubbles at the initial time can be supported by a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Section 4 
presents a specification of symmetric Nash equilibria, according to which the bubble 
persists for a while. Section 5 focuses on the case when the terminal time is sufficiently 
late, and illustrates that the bubble can persist for a long period even if every arbitrageur 
is almost certainly rational. Section 6 characterizes the set of symmetric Nash equilibria 
and considers the uniqueness issue. Section 7 is devoted to the self-control problem.   10
2. The Model 
 
This paper considers the trade in a company’s shares on a stock market during the 
time interval  0 [0, ] τ . The fundamental value of this company’s shares is considered to 
be  [0,1) y∈  at the initial time 0, and it grows exponentially at the market interest rate 
[0, ) δ ∈∞ . Further, we assume that no dividends are paid. There exist  2 n ≥  
arbitrageurs, each of whom decides the timing to exit the stock market by selling out 
her/his stockholding, which is normalized to a single share. At the initial time 0, they 
recognize that the bubble has occurred at or before this time. This bubble persists as 
long as no arbitrageur sells her/his stockholding. 
  Figure 1 illustrates the process that leads to bubbles and crashes. If no arbitrageur 
sells before time  0 [0, ] τ τ ∈ , the stock price per share grows at a rate higher than the 
interest rate. It is considered to be the precrash price  e
ρτ , where  ρ δ >  is referred to 
as the growth rate of bubbles. The precrash price at the initial time 0 is normalized to 1. 
If there exists any arbitrageur who sells at time  τ , we regard this time as the X-Day. 
This selling pressure bursts the bubble at the moment immediately after X-Day  τ , and 
the stock price declines to the postcrash price  e
ρτ λ . We assume that  1 y λ << , i.e., the 
postcrash price  e
ρτ λ  is less than precrash price  e
ρτ  but greater than the fundamental   11
value  ye
δτ  at time τ . This arbitrageur can sell at the precrash price e
ρτ , and the 
bubble crashes just after she/he has completed selling out her/his stockholding. If no 
arbitrageur has sold during the time interval  0 [0, ] τ , the bubble inevitably crashes at the 





Against the abovementioned background, we implicitly assume the presence of 
behavioral  traders who have psychological biases that lead them to engage in 
momentum trading. They incorrectly believe that the stock price will grow at the growth 
rate  ρ δ >  in perpetuity, and attempt to maintain the stock price at the precrash price. 
The moment any arbitrageur sells her/his share, the resulting selling pressure 
immediately dampens their enthusiasm and leads to the crash of the bubble. Even if no 
arbitrageur has sold out, their enthusiasm is automatically dampened for exogenous 
reasons at the moment immediately after the terminal time  0 τ . 
The selling pressure does not instantaneously cause a drastic dampening in the 
enthusiasm of behavioral arbitrageurs, since  ey e
ρτδ τ λ >  for  all  0 [0, ] τ τ ∈ . Hence, the 
                                                 
7  We assume that each arbitrageur’s position is restricted to be either 0 or +1.   12
stock price soft-lands, i.e., it does not immediately decline to the fundamental value 
ye
δτ . Let us refer to the soft-landing index as  λ . The postcrash price increases at the 
same rate that the precrash price does, namely,  ρ . 
We arbitrarily set  (0,1) ε ∈  and  (0,1) r∈ . By regarding the n arbitrageurs as 
players, we define a timing game  0 (, ,, ,,,) Gn r τ δρλ ε =  as follows. A strategy for 
each arbitrageur  {1,..., } in ∈  is defined as a cumulative distribution  0 :[0, ] [0,1] i q τ →  
that is nondecreasing, right continuous, and satisfies  0 ()1 i q τ = .
8 Let  i Q   denote the set 
of strategies for arbitrageur  i. 
We assume that each arbitrageur  {1,..., } in ∈  is not necessarily rational. She/he is 
either rational or behavioral in the following manner. With the probability 1 ε − , 
arbitrageur  i is rational; further, according to strategy  i q , she/he plans to sell at or 
before each time  0 [0, ] i a τ ∈  with the probability  0 ()[ 0 ,] ii qa τ ∈ . With regard to the 
remaining probability  ε , arbitrageur  i  is behavioral like the behavioral traders; she/he 
does not follow strategy  i q  and never bursts the bubble of her/his own accord. 
Whether or not each arbitrageur is behavioral is independently determined. Each 
arbitrageur does not know if the other arbitrageurs are rational. 
                                                 
8 We will consider  ii qa =  to be a pure strategy if  () 0 i q τ =  for all  [0, ) i a τ ∈ , and 
() 1 i q τ =  for  all  0 [,] i a τ τ ∈ .   13
Assuming that arbitrageur i  is rational, if arbitrageur  ' is  time choice  i a  is 
earlier than that of any other rational arbitrageur, she/he sells just at her/his planned 
time  i a   and earns the present value of the precrash price 
() i a e
ρδ −  as  the winner’s gain. 
If there exists any other arbitrageur  j i ≠   who is rational and whose time choice  j a  is 
the earliest (and earlier than  i a ), arbitrageur  i  loses. She/he earns the present value of 
the postcrash price 
() j a e
ρδ λ
−  as the loser’s gain by selling out at the next moment. If 
arbitrageur  ' is  time choice is the earliest but there exists another arbitrageur whose 
time choice is the same as that of arbitrageur i, arbitrageur i wins only with the 
probability (0,1) r∈ .
9   In this case, her/his expected earning is given by 
() {( 1) }
i a rr e
ρδ λ
− +− . 
Let  1 n QQ Q =× ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ×. Let  1 ( ,..., ) n qq q Q = ∈  denote a strategy profile. We define 
the payoff function  : i uQ R →  for each arbitrageur  {1,..., } in ∈  as follows. We 
arbitrarily set 
0 () [ 0 ,]
n
jj N aa τ ∈ =∈  and assume that any rational arbitrageur 
{1,..., } in ∈  selects  i a . We then arbitrarily set any subset  {1,..., } Hn ⊂ . We assume 
that any arbitrageur in subset H  could be behavioral, while any arbitrageur in its 
complementary set {1,..., }\ nH  could be rational. Then, any rational arbitrageur 
                                                 
9 At the expense of complexity, we could allow r  to be dependent on the number of 
arbitrageurs whose time choices are the earliest. This dependence is irrelevant to this paper 
since tie-breaking hardly occurs, except at the initial time 0.   14





ρδ − =    if  ij aa <  for  all  {} j Hi ∉ ∪ , 
  
() (, ){ ( 1 ) }
i a
i vHa r r e
ρδ λ
− =+ −  if  ij aa ≤  for  all  {} j Hi ∉ ∪ , and 
ji aa =  for  some  {} jH i ∉ ∪ . 






− =    if  ji aa < , and  jj aa ′ ≤  for  all  { } j Hj ′∉ ∪ . 
We define  ( ) i uq  as the expected value of  ( , ) i vHa: 
1
{1,..., }\{ }




uq E vHa q εε
−−
⊂
≡− ∑ . 
The probability that there exists any arbitrageur  j i ≠  other than arbitrageur i who 
sells at or before time  τ   is given by 
(1)     (; ) 1 { 1 ( 1 ) () } ii j
ji
Dq q τ ετ −
≠
≡− − − ∏ . 
From (1), it follows that 
(2)     (0, ) 1 (0; ) { (1 ) } (0; ) ii ii ii uq Dq r rDq λ −− − =− + + − , 
and 
(3)    
() (, ) { 1 (; ) }
i a
ii i ii i uaq e Daq
ρδ −
−− =−  








−− ↑ ++− −  
()
0
(; ) ( 0 ; )
i a







++ ∫  for  all  0 (0, ] i a τ ∈ . 
Moreover, the probability that the bubble crashes at or before time  τ   is given by   15
1




Dq q τ εε τ
=
≡− + − − ∏ . 













The hazard rate multiplied by  dτ  indicates the conditional probability that the bubble 
crashes over the interval  [ , ] d τ ττ + , given that the bubble has persisted up to time  τ . 
A strategy profile qQ ∈  is said to be symmetric  in  G  if  1 i qq =  for all 
{1,..., } in ∈ . A strategy profile  qQ ∈   is said to be a Nash equilibrium in  G  if 
() ( , ) ii i i uq uqq − ′ ≥  for  all  {1,..., } in ∈  and  all  ii qQ ′∈ .   16
3. Quick Crashes 
 
We denote the symmetric pure strategy profile by  (0,...,0) q ≡   , according to 
which any rational arbitrageur sells at the initial time 0. The bubble quickly crashes at 
the initial time 0, except in the case where all arbitrageurs are behavioral. Note that for 
every {1,..., } in ∈ , 
  
11 ( ) (1 ){ (1 ) }
nn
i uq r r ε ελ
−− =+ − + −   , 
and 
  
() 11 (, ) ( 1 )
i a nn
ii i uaq e
ρδ ε ελ
− −−
− =+ −    for  all  0 (0, ] i a τ ∈ . 
Hence,  q     is a Nash equilibrium in  G   if and only if 
  
0 () 11 1 1 (1 ){ (1 ) } (1 )
nn n n rr e
ρδτ ε ελ ε ε λ
− −− − − +− +− ≥ +− , 
that is, 
(4)    
0 () 11 1 (1 )(1 )
nn n er
ρδτ ε ελ ε
− −− − ≤− − + . 
This implies that if the terminal time  0 τ  is not greatly delayed in relation to the 
smallness of  ε , timing game  G   can describe the case where any rational arbitrageur 
never rides the bubble as a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Note that  0 ε =  automatically 
guarantees (4), i.e., it guarantees the Nash equilibrium property of  q   . 
  The main body of this paper will assume that  0 ε > . We shall also focus on other   17
symmetric Nash equilibria, according to which rational arbitrageurs do ride the bubble. 
The assumption of  0 ε >  is very crucial, without which the backward induction 
method eliminates all strategy profiles except q   , i.e., q    becomes the unique Nash 
equilibrium. 
   18
4. Bubbles and Crashes 
 
We arbitrarily set  0 ˆ [0, ] τ τ ∈ , which we refer to as the hazard time. Let us specify a 






= =∈   as follows: for every  {1,..., } in ∈ , 
ˆ() 0 ii qa
τ =  for  all  ˆ [0, ) i a τ ∈ , 
and 




















 for  all  0 ˆ [, ] i a τ τ ∈ . 
In order for 
ˆ q
τ   to be well specified, we need to assume that 
(6)    
0 ˆ () ()
exp[ ]








because (6) guarantees 
ˆ ˆ () 0 i q
τ τ ≥ . 
According to 
ˆ q
τ , no arbitrageur ever bursts the bubble until the hazard time  ˆ τ . 
The X-Day is randomly selected over the interval  0 ˆ [, ] τ τ ; the hazard rate 
ˆ (; ) q
τ θτ  at 
time  τ   for strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ   is equal to 
   
ˆ (; ) 0 q
τ θτ =       i f   ˆ 0 τ τ < < , 
and 
(7)    












    i f   0 ˆ τ ττ < < . 
Note that the hazard rate after the hazard time  ˆ τ  is constant with respect to time τ , 
and increases with respect to the growth rate  ρ   and the soft-landing index  λ .   19
 
Theorem 1: Based on the assumption in (6), strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ   is a Nash equilibrium 
in  G   if and only if (6) holds with equality, i.e., 
(8)    
0 ˆ () ()
exp[ ]








where for every  {1,..., } in ∈ , 
(9)    
ˆˆ ()
0 ( ) exp[( ) ( 1)(1 )log ] i uq e n
τρ δ τ ρ δτ λ ε
− == − + − − . 
 
Proof: Note that (8) is necessary for 
ˆ q
τ   to be a Nash equilibrium. Without (8), 
ˆ
i q
τ  is 
discontinuous at the hazard time, i.e., 
ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ () l i m () 0 ii qq
ττ
ττ ττ
↑ >= ; each arbitrageur prefers to 
sell slightly earlier than  ˆ τ  instead of  ˆ τ , which contradicts the Nash equilibrium 
property. 
Suppose that (8) holds. From (1), 
ˆ (; ) 0 ii Dq
τ τ − =  for  all  ˆ [0, ) τ τ ∈ , 
and 
   
0 () ()







− =−  for  all  0 ˆ [, ] τ ττ ∈ . 
Hence, from (2), (3), and (8), 
ˆ () (, )
i a
ii i uaq e
ρδ τ −
− =  for  all  ˆ [0, ] i a τ ∈ , 
and the following first-order conditions hold. For every  0 ˆ [, ] i a τ τ ∈ ,   20
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aa nn ee e e
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ρδ ε λ ε
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0 = . 
From the continuity of 
ˆ q
τ  and  (8), 
ˆˆ ()
0 ˆ ( , ) exp[( ) ( 1)(1 )log ] ii uq e n
τρ δ τ τ ρδ τ λ ε
−
− == − + − − , 
which implies (9). Since 
ˆ () () i a ee
ρδ ρδτ − − ≥  for  all  ˆ [0, ) i a τ ∈ , it follows that 
ˆˆ () (, ) ii i i uq uaq
τ τ
− ≥  for  all  0 [0, ] i a τ ∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
 
We show that for every  0 ˆ (0, ) τ τ ∈ , there exists  (0,1) ε ∈  such that timing game 
0 (, ,, ,,,) Gn r τ δρλ ε =  can describe the pattern of bubbles and crashes where the 
bubble persists until terminal time  ˆ τ , and later crashes at the hazard rate 








, as is characteristic of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 2:  For every  0 ˆ (0, ) τ τ ∈ , there exist  (0,1) ε ∈  and a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium q in  0 (, ,, ,,,) Gn r τ δρλ ε =  such  that   21
(0) 0 i q =  for  all  {1,..., } in ∈ , 
(;) 0 q θ τ =  for  all  ˆ (0, ) τ τ ∈ , 
and 












 for  all  0 ˆ (, ) τ ττ ∈ . 
 
Proof: In this case, we only have to show that there exists  (0,1) ε ∈  such  that 
ˆ q
τ  is  a 
Nash equilibrium in 
0 (, ,, ,,,) Gn r τ δρλ ε = . From Theorem 1, (8) is sufficient for 
ˆ q
τ  
to be a Nash equilibrium. Since 
0 ˆ () ()
0 exp[ ] 1






, it follows that  (0,1) ε ∈ . 
Q.E.D. 
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5. Late Terminal Time 
 
From (8), the distance between the hazard time  ˆ τ  and terminal time  0 τ  is given 
by 
0







This distance does not depend on the terminal time  0 τ . The hazard time is postponed at 
the same rate as the terminal time. 
Let us confine our attention to timing games where the terminal time  0 τ  is 
sufficiently late. We will show that even a very small probability ε  of each 
arbitrageur’s being behavioral facilitates the persistence of bubbles. We arbitrarily set 






=  such  that 
   
[] []
0 ˆ 0
mm ττ >>  for  all  1,2,... m = , 









→∞ = ∞ , and 
[] []
0 ˆ lim( )
mm
m ττ
→∞ − =∞. 
For every  1,2,... m = , we specify that 
(10)    
[] []
[] 0 ˆ () ( )
exp[ ]











From (10), note that 
[] (0,1)
m ε ∈ , i.e., 
[] m ε  is well specified. From (8) and (10), for 
every 1,2,... m = , strategy profile 
[] ˆ m
q
τ   is a Nash equilibrium in G , where 
[] []
00 (,)( , )
mm τε τ ε =   was assumed. From (10) and 
[] []
0 ˆ lim( )
mm
m ττ
→∞ − =∞, it follows that   23
[] []
[] 0 ˆ () ( )
lim limexp[ ] 0















→∞ =∞ implies that even with a very small probability  ε  that 
each arbitrageur is behavioral, we can describe the infinitely long persistence of 
bubbles as a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
According to the Nash equilibrium property of 
ˆ q
τ , any time choice in the interval 
0 ˆ [, ] τ τ  is a best response to 
ˆ q
τ . This implies that each rational arbitrageur  i has an 
incentive to postpone the market timing until the terminal time  0 τ . Hence, 
0
0
ˆˆ () 1( )
0
0
() (, ) l i m ( ; )
n
ii i i i uq u q e e d D q
τ







′ == + ∫ . 




ρ δτ τε ε
− − =≡ , 
which we refer to as the gain from behavioral arbitrageurs; in other words, she/he can 
earn  w  as the winner’s gain when all the other arbitrageurs are behavioral. The 
following theorem states that the gain from behavioral arbitrageurs  w is  negligible  in 
relation to 
ˆˆ () () i uq e
τρ δτ − = . 
 
Theorem 3: The following property holds: 












− →∞ = . 
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Proof: From (10) and 
[] []
0 ˆ lim( )
mm
m ττ
→∞ −= ∞ , it follows that 
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0









  The remaining payoff 
ˆ () i uq w













′ ∫ , which 
corresponds to the loser’s gain when some of the other arbitrageurs are rational. 
Theorem 3 implies that any rational arbitrageur expects to earn hardly any profit by 
exploiting behavioral arbitrageurs; instead, she/he expects a considerable increase in the 
loser’s gain by postponing the market timing. The following theorem shows that the 
gain from behavioral arbitrageurs  w  can be small even in absolute terms. 
 
Theorem 4: The following properties hold: 
(i)     
[] []
0 [0 lim ( , ) ]
mm
m w τε










τ →∞ = ; 












0 [lim ( , ) 0]
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→∞ = ; 
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m w τε
→∞ = ∞ . 
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Proof: From (10), 
(11)    
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0 () [] [] [] 1
0 lim ( , ) lim( )




→∞ →∞ =  
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This along with (11) implies property (iii). From properties (ii) and (iii), it follows that 
if 
[]















τ →∞ =   must hold. This implies property (i). 
                Q.E.D. 
 
Property (i) of Theorem 4 is particularly important because whenever the gain from 
behavioral arbitrageurs is non-negligible, i.e., 
[] []
0 lim ( , ) 0
mm
m w τε
→∞ > , and moderate, i.e., 
[] []
0 lim ( , )
mm
m w τε









=   of the hazard time to the terminal time is 
approximated by the soft-landing index  λ . Note that given that the terminal time  0 τ  is 





. Hence, it is almost certain that the ratio of the X-Day to the   26





By approximating the ratio of the X-Day to  0 λτ , we can regard 
0 (1 )e
λρτ λ −  as 
the range of the stock price drop on the X-Day. Note that 
0 (1 )e

















  is close to 1. Hence, the more the 
bubble soft-lands, the greater is the range of the stock price drop on the X-Day. 









=  is less than λ , the gain from 
behavioral arbitrageurs must be negligible, i.e., 
[] []
0 lim ( , ) 0
mm
m w τε
→∞ = . Hence, even if any 
rational arbitrageur hardly expects to have an advantage over the other behavioral 
arbitrageurs in absolute terms, the bubble persists for a significantly long time.   27
6. Uniqueness 
 
This section characterizes the set of all symmetric Nash equilibria, and then shows 
a sufficient condition for strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ  to be the unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium. We arbitrarily set  0 ˆ (0, ) τ τ ∈  and  (0,1) k∈ . Let us specify another 
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 for  all  0 ˆ [, ] i a τ τ ∈ . 
In order for 
ˆ (,) k q
τ   to be well specified, we need to assume 
(12)    
0 ˆ () ()
{1 (1 ) }exp[ ]










because (12) guarantees 
ˆ (,) ˆ () 0
k
i q
τ τ ≥ . 
According to 
ˆ (,) k q
τ , with probability  0 k > , any rational arbitrageur bursts the 
bubble at the initial time 0. With probability 10 k − > , she/he never bursts the bubble 
until the hazard time  ˆ τ . The hazard rate 
ˆ (,) (; )
k q
τ θτ  for 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  is the same as that for 
ˆ q
τ : 
ˆ (,) (; ) 0
k q
τ θτ =      i f   0 τ τ < <  , 
and   28












 if  0 ˆ τ ττ < < . 
 
Proposition 5:  Based on the assumption in (12), strategy profile 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  is a Nash 
equilibrium in  G   if and only if 
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and (12) holds with equality, i.e., 
(14)   
0 ˆ () ()
{1 (1 ) }exp[ ]










where for every  {1,..., } in ∈ , 
(15)    
ˆ (,) 1 ( )1( 1 ) ( 1 ) [ 1{ 1( 1 ) }]
kn
i uq r k
τ λε
− =− − − − − − . 
 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
From (15), it follows that 
ˆ (,) () 1
k
i uq
τ < , i.e., the payoff induced by 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  is less 
than the precrash price at the initial time. Hence, no rational arbitrageur takes advantage 
of riding the bubble. The following theorem indicates a characteristic of the set of 
symmetric Nash equilibria, which states that there exists no symmetric Nash 
equilibrium other than  q   , 
ˆ q
τ , and 
ˆ (,) k q
τ . 
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Theorem 6: If any strategy profile  q Q ∈   is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in  G , then 
any one of the following three properties hold: 
(iv)  qq =  . 
(v) 
ˆ qq
τ = , where  0 ˆ [0, ] τ τ ∈   is given by (7). 
(vi) 
ˆ (,) k qq
τ = , where  0 ˆ [0, ] τ τ ∈  and  [0,1] k∈   satisfy (13) and (14). 
 
Proof: We set any symmetric Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  arbitrarily.  Let 
   01 1 inf{ (0, ]: ( ) (0)} qq τ ττ τ =∈ >    and  01 min{ [0, ]: ( ) 1} q τ ττ τ = ∈= . 
  First, we show that  1() q τ  is continuous in  0 [0, ] τ . Suppose that  1() q τ  is not 
continuous in  0 [0, ] τ . Then, there exists  [,] τ ττ ′∈    such  that  0 τ′>  and 
11 lim ( ) ( ) qq
ττ τ τ
′ ↑
′ < . From  01 λ << ,  01 r < < , and the symmetry of  q, it follows that 
any arbitrageur can increase her/his probability of becoming the winner by selecting any 
time that is slightly earlier than time τ′ instead of time τ′. This implies that no 
arbitrageur ever selects time  τ′, which is a contradiction. 
Second, we show that  1() q τ  is increasing in  (, ) τ τ   . Suppose that  1() q τ  is not 
increasing in  (, ) τ τ   . From the continuity of  1 q   and the definition of  τ  , we can select 
,[ , ) τ ττ τ ′′ ′ ∈    such  that τ τ ′′ ′ < ,  11 () () qq τ τ ′ ′′ = , and time choice  τ′  is a best response. 
Since no arbitrageur selects any time τ  in ( , ) τ τ ′ ′′ , by selecting time τ′′  instead of   30
τ′, any arbitrageur can increase the winner’s gain without decreasing the probability of 
winning this gain. This is a contradiction. 
Third, we show that either  0 τ =  or  0 τ τ = . Suppose that  0 0 τ τ <<. Since 
1() q τ  is continuous at time τ , by selecting time  0 τ  instead of τ , any arbitrageur 
can increase the winner’s gain from 
() e
ρ δτ −  to 
0 () e
ρ δτ −  without decreasing the 
probability of winning this gain. This contradicts the fact that time choice  τ  is a best 
response. 
Suppose that  (0,...,0) q ≠ , i.e., property (v) does not hold. Since either  0 τ =  or 
0 τ τ = , it follows that  0 τ τ = . Since  1() q τ  is increasing in  (, ) τ τ   , any time choice 
0 [, ] τ ττ ∈    is a best response to  q. Hence, the following first-order conditions must 
hold: for every  0 [, ] τ ττ ∈   , 
      
() () 11 11
11
(, ) (; )














      
()
1





− =−  for  all  0 [, ] τ ττ ∈   , 
where  C  is a positive real number. The continuity of  1 q  along with the symmetry of 
q implies  that 
(16)     
0 ()
1 1
10 1 (; )1 1





− =− =− , 
and   31
(17)     
()
1







  . 
From (16), it follows that 
0 ()




− − = , and therefore, 
(18)     
0 () ()
1 1






− =−  for  all  0 [, ] τ ττ ∈   . 
 Suppose  that  1(0) 0 q = . Note that the symmetry of  q implies that  11 (0; ) 0 Dq − = , 
which along with (17) and (18) implies that 
   0






  . 
These observations imply that 
ˆ qq
τ = , where  ˆ τ  is given by (7). Hence, property (vi) 
holds. 
 Suppose  that  1(0) 0 q > . Then, there is a positive real number  (0,1) k∈  such that 
1(0) qk =  and 
1
11 (0; ) 1 {1 (1 ) }
n Dq k ε
−
− =− − − . This along with (17) and (18) implies 
that 
   0











  . 
These observations imply that 
ˆ (,) k qq
τ = , where  ˆ (,) k τ  satisfies (14). Since 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  is a 
Nash equilibrium,  ˆ (,) k τ   also satisfies (13). Hence, property (vii) holds. 
Q.E.D. 
 
The proof of Theorem 6 shows that in order for any symmetric strategy profile 
other than  (0,...,0) q =    to be a Nash equilibrium, there must exist the hazard time  ˆ τ    32
such that any time choice between this time and the terminal time is a best response. 
This implies that the first-order conditions addressed in the proof of Theorem 6 play a 
crucial role in eliminating all strategy profiles, except for 
ˆ q
τ  and 
ˆ (,) k q
τ . 
The Nash equilibrium properties of  (0,...,0) q =    and 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  require that time 
choice 0 be a best response. This along with Theorem 6 implies that whenever time 
choice 0 is a dominated strategy, strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ  must be the unique symmetric 
Nash equilibrium. Hence, we can show a sufficient condition for 
ˆ q
τ  to be the unique 
symmetric Nash equilibrium as follows. 
 
Theorem 7: With the assumption in (7), strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ  is the unique symmetric 
Nash equilibrium in G  if the gain from behavioral arbitrageurs is greater than 
1 1( 1 )
n ε λ
− −− , i.e., 
  (19)  
1
0 (,)1( 1 )
n w τ εε λ
− >− − . 
 
Proof: For every  qQ ∈ , 
       11 (0, ) 1 uq − ≤  and 
0 () 11
10 1 (, ) ( 1 )
nn uq e
ρδτ τ εε λ
− −−
− ≥+ − , 
which along with (19) implies that time choice 0 is dominated by time choice  0 τ , i.e., 
       10 1 1 1 (, ) ( 0 , ) uqu q τ −− >  for  all  11 qQ − − ∈ .   33
Hence, any symmetric Nash equilibrium  qQ ∈  must satisfy  1(0) 0 q = , which along 
with Theorem 6 implies that 
ˆ qq
τ = . 
Q.E.D. 
 
We assume that the terminal time  0 τ  is sufficiently late. Then,  ε  must be close 
to zero, and therefore, the right-hand side of (19) is approximated by 1 λ − . Hence, 
from Theorem 7, it follows that strategy profile 
ˆ q
τ  is the unique symmetric Nash 
equilibrium if the gain from behavioral arbitrageurs  0 (,) w τ ε  is greater than 1 λ − . 
From Theorems 5 and 7, we conclude that the high soft-landing index  λ   not only plays 
a decisive role in prolonging the equilibrium persistence of bubbles but also in 
eliminating irrelevant equilibria. 
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7. Quasi-Rationality 
 
We have assumed that each arbitrageur knows whether she/he is rational or 
behavioral from the beginning of the timing game. This section, however, eliminates 
this assumption. Instead, we assume that all arbitrageurs are quasi-rational as follows. 
We arbitrarily set 
*
0 (0, ) τ τ ∈  and  (0,1) ε ∈ . We shall refer to 
* τ  as  the  critical time. 
We assume (8) and 
* ˆ τ τ < . Until the critical time 
* τ , each arbitrageur i behaves 
rationally and then follows 
ˆ q
τ . Once the bubble has persisted beyond the critical time 
* τ , she/he becomes behavioral with probability ε ; in other words, she/he stops 
following 
ˆ q
τ   and is committed to not bursting the bubble of her/his own accord. With 
probability  1 ε − , she/he remains rational and continues to follow 
ˆ q
τ  even after the 
critical time 
* τ . 
This section will provide an affirmative answer to the question of whether even 
quasi-rational arbitrageurs are willing to follow 
ˆ q
τ . If arbitrageur  i is  rational,  she/he 
obtains 
ˆˆ () () i uq e
τρ δτ − = . We assume that no behavioral arbitrageur can sell out before 
the stock price declines to the fundamental value; in this case, she/he obtains  y  as  the 
payoff evaluated at the initial time. Hence, according to 
ˆ q
τ , any quasi-rational 
arbitrageur  i  obtains the expected payoff given by   35
ˆ () (1 )ey
ρδτ ε ε
− −+ . 
Quasi-rational arbitrageur  i is faced with the following self-control problem. By 
selecting the critical time 
* τ  as the timing to sell out instead of following 
ˆ
i q
τ , she/he 
can avoid the loss from her/his becoming behavioral, and obtains the winner’s gain 
* () e
ρ δτ −   with certainty. Hence, in order for any quasi-rational arbitrageur to follow 
ˆ q
τ , 
it is necessary and sufficient to satisfy not only (8) but also the inequality 
(20)    
* ˆ () () (1 )ey e
ρ δτ ρ δτ εε
−− −+ ≥ . 
Note that inequality (20) does not hold if the critical time 
* τ   is close to the hazard 
time  ˆ τ ; in this case,  (0,...,0) q =    is the unique Nash equilibrium. If the terminal time 
0 τ  is sufficiently late, however, the requirement of (20) is not restrictive at all; in this 
case,  ε  can be close to zero. Hence, the right-hand side of (20) is close to 
ˆ () e
ρ δτ − , 
which is greater than 
* () e
ρ δτ −  since 
* ˆ τ τ < . Given that the terminal time  0 τ  is 
sufficiently late, we can conclude that the Nash equilibrium property of 
ˆ q
τ   is robust to 
the quasi-rational arbitrageurs’ self-control. 
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Note that (14) is necessary for 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  to be a Nash equilibrium. Without (14), 
ˆ (,) k
i q
τ  is discontinuous at the hazard time  ˆ τ , i.e., 
ˆˆ (,) (,)





↑ >= ; hence, 
each arbitrageur prefers any time slightly earlier than  ˆ τ  instead of  ˆ τ , and this 




We suppose that (14) holds. From (1), 
   





− =− − −  for  all  ˆ [0, ) τ τ ∈ , 
and 
   
0 () ()







− =−  for  all  0 ˆ [, ] τ ττ ∈ . 
From (2), (3), and (14), it follows in the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 1 that 
(A1)    
ˆ (,) 1 ( 0 , )1( 1 ) ( 1 ) [ 1{ 1( 1 ) }]
kn
ii uq r k
τ λε
−
− =− − − − − − , 
(A2)    
ˆ () (,) 1 1 (, ) [ 1{ 1( 1 ) }]{ 1( 1 ) }
i a kn n
ii i uaq k k e
ρδ τ λε ε
− −−
− =− − − + − −  
for all  ˆ (0, ) i a τ ∈ , 
and 
(A3)    





1 [( 1) { 1 ( 1) }
n rk λλ ε
− =+ − − −  
0 ˆ () ()
ˆ 1( ) 1 (1 )(1 ) ]
n re e
ρδτ τ
ρ δτ λ λε
−−
−− − +− −  for  all  0 ˆ [, ] i a τ τ ∈ . 
Note that (A1) implies (15). From (14),   40
0 ˆ () ()
ˆ 11 ( ) 1 [ (1 ) {1 (1 ) } (1 )(1 ) ]
nn rkr e e
ρδτ τ
ρ δτ λ λλ ε λ ε
−−
−− − − +− −− +− −  
ˆ 11 ( ) [1 {1 (1 ) } ] {1 (1 ) }
nn kk e
ρ δτ λε ε
−− − =− − − + − − , 
which along with (A2) and (A3) imply that 
ˆˆ (,) (,) ()( ,)
kk
ii i i uq uaq
ττ
− ≥  for  all  0 (0, ] i a τ ∈ . 
Hence, from (A1) and (A3), 
ˆ (,) k q
τ  is a Nash equilibrium in G  if and only if 
ˆˆ (,) (,) ()( 0 ,)
kk
ii i uq u q
ττ
− = , that is, 
0 ˆ () ()
ˆ 11 ( ) 1 [ (1 ) {1 (1 ) } (1 )(1 ) ]
nn rkr e e
ρδτ τ
ρ δτ λ λλ ε λ ε
−−
−− − − +− −− +− −  
   
1 1( 1 ) ( 1 ) [ 1{ 1( 1 ) }]
n rk λε
− =− − − − − − , 
which is equivalent to (13).   41
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